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The Great Recession and the upsurge of  widespread social movements in various crisis-ridden 
countries have given new impetus to the debate on the relationship between economic breakdown and 
the occurrence of  collective action. I revisit the issue by examining strike activity in Spain between 
2002 and 2013. For a better understanding of  the continuities and changes, I contrast two sets of  
literature on industrial conflict. The first deals with economic factors influencing strikes or, in other 
words, with the question of  whether and how fluctuations in manpower supply and demand account 
for continuities and changes in strike activity. The second advocates for a look beyond the economy, 
towards the political exchange that takes place between unions and state actors and which, depending 
on its positive or negative nature, leads to shifts of  the distributional struggle away from the 
marketplace towards the public arena or vice versa. The findings reveal that, rather than exclusive, the 
two perspectives prove to be mutually conducive and are most significant when they are combined. 
The political exchange model is helpful for understanding the rather stable or even declining strike 
frequency prior to the economic crisis but also the three nationwide general strikes in 2010 and 2012, 
which represented a rupture in the social consensus. If  the general strikes are left aside, the economic 
variables come into play: an increased strike frequency during the economic crisis is in fact 
accompanied by a shift towards smaller strikes related to a single workplace, and to so-called 
“defensive” strikes. This indicates that an actual decrease in workers’ bargaining power was 
overcompensated by a growing number of  circumstances in which the recourse to strike action became 
a means of  last resort.  
 
KEY WORDS 





In the aftermath of  the Great Recession (2007–2012) more and more scholars began to dedicate their 
work to people’s political responses to the negative consequences of  the economic crisis. An ever-
growing literature in electoral research trying to explain apparent shifts in voting behaviour (Bartels 
and Bermeo, 2014; Hernández and Kriesi, 2016; Whiteley, 2016) is accompanied by an increasing 
                                                 
1 A draft of  this paper was presented at the International Sociological Association’s RC48 PhD Workshop, 
Vienna, 9 July 2016. 
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number of  publications on social movements, notably on the “Indignados” in Spain and the “Occupy” 
movement in the United States (Graeber, 2012; Della Porta and Mattoni, 2014; Ancelovici, Dufour 
and Nez, 2016; Romanos, 2016; Della Porta et al., 2017). Research on industrial conflict, too, has 
benefited from this general upswing (Gallas, Nowak and Wilde, 2012; Nowak and Gallas, 2014; Gallas 
and Nowak, 2016). However, the literature on Spain still reveals some weaknesses: either it is mainly 
descriptive (Gil and Hernández, 2014; Lacalle, 2015) or it focuses primarily on political aspects of  
strikes (Luque, 2012b), leaving aside economic factors that are likely to affect strike activity in times of  
economic crisis. 
By conducting this research on the evolution of  strike activity in Spain between 2002 and 2013, 
I will contribute to filling this gap. The economic factors will be analysed by measuring shifts in 
manpower supply and demand which, according to the Business Cycle Model (Rist, 1907; Rees, 1952; 
Skeels, 1971), lead to concomitant shifts in workers’ bargaining power and thereby influence the 
likelihood of  strikes. Regarding the political aspects of  strikes, I will include the tripartite negotiations 
between unions, employers and the state in order to examine whether strikes should rather be 
considered as a consequence of  a rupture in the positive political exchange between unions and the 
state, in which the government trades goods in exchange for social consensus (Pizzorno, 1978).  
In order to examine the relevance of  the Business Cycle Model, two successive six-year periods 
in Spain’s recent history will be compared – the first precedes the crisis (2002–2007) and the second 
covers the first six years following the outbreak of  the Great Recession (2008–2013). Both periods are 
characterised by contrary trends in employment data. This subdivision will enable me to stress not only 
general trends or year-to-year changes but also to compare the two periods en bloc.2. For the scrutiny 
of  the Political Exchange Model, the entire period under study will be examined in terms of  the 
changes in government and the evolution of  tripartite negotiations between the unions, the employers 
and the state. 
The article is structured as follows: In a first step, I present different explanatory models for 
strikes, notably the Business Cycle Model and the Political Exchange Model. Thereafter, I explicate the 
notion of  the shape of  strikes (Shorter and Tilly, 1971, 1974) and its different aspects. The subsequent 
analysis begins with a general exploration of  the data at a national level and is followed by an industry 
comparison. It is completed by including strike motives and strike outcomes, which provide a better 
understanding of  how the crisis affected both the (offensive or defensive) nature of  strikes and the 
workers’ bargaining power. 
 
 
Explaining Strike Activity 
Social sciences have proposed various – in part contradictory – models for strike activity. In this section 
I will discuss some of  the main approaches and present the perspective adopted in this article. 
Historically, the first model to propose an explanation for strike activity is the so-called Business 
Cycle Model (Rist, 1907). This model acts on the assumption of  a positive correlation between 
economic boom and strike activity due to the fluctuations in manpower supply and demand (Rist, 
1907; Rees, 1952; Skeels, 1971). In expansive economic periods, the need for manpower increases while 
                                                 
2 Which would be more disputable if  the adjacent years were taken into account, since the unemployment rate 
increased by 0.8 percentage point between 2001 and 2002, and started to decrease again from 2014 onwards. 
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its supply decreases. Due to the difficulties of  hiring new staff, employers would thus try to avoid 
dismissals when facing strike actions. The workers – knowing that even if  they were to be dismissed, 
they could rapidly take on a new job – are strengthened in their bargaining position, which increases 
their propensity to participate in strike action.  
In opposition to the Business Cycle Model, economic hardship or relative deprivation theories 
expect that “both short-term and persistent deprivation are significant causes of  the various forms of  
civil strife” (Gurr, 1969: 603). These theories, which were initially used for understanding the 
emergence of  mobs, revolts or revolutions, were later applied to industrial conflict in order to explain 
heightened strike activity after periods of  high inflation (Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson, 1972; Soskice, 
1978).  
In a Marxist perspective, struggle is inherent in labour–capital relations (Hyman, 1975). In this 
line, Silver (2003) asserts that historical capitalism is based on two contradictory tendencies, which lead 
to pendulum swings between “crises of  profitability and crises of  social legitimacy” (Silver, 2003: 17). 
Thus, the expansion of  capitalist production would lead to a strengthening of  labour movements. With 
the objective of  bringing labour under control, capital (and states) would have to make concessions, 
which provoke crises of  profitability. In order to restore profits, capital (and states) would then again 
have to break established social conventions and intensify the commodification of  labour, thereby 
producing crises of  social legitimacy and backlash resistances. In this perspective, crises of  profitability 
are provoked by so-called “Marx-type labour unrest” – that is, offensive struggles led by the emerging 
working class. On the opposite side, crises of  social legitimacy lead to “Polanyi-type labour unrest” – 
that is, backlash resistances to the continuous spread of  self-regulating markets, in particular by the 
workers most affected by the disbanding of  social contracts or by global economic transformations 
(Silver, 2003: 20).  
Proponents of  the institutionalisation approach argue that more attention should be paid to the 
institutional context and to the continuing regulation and thus institutionalisation of  unions and their 
means of  action (Adam and Reynaud, 1978). In this perspective, unions would increasingly opt for 
institutional channels – which are considered more efficient and less costly than strike actions – in 
order to reach agreements with employers (Tixier, 2007).  
Closer to political science, researchers stressed the importance of  considering the political 
context and the resulting political exchange between governments and unions (Hibbs, 1978; Pizzorno, 
1978). In this model, strike activity is explained by the power of  unions in the political sphere. In 
countries where bonds between government and unions are strong, unions are expected to avoid the 
costs of  strike action and to intervene in the political sphere, where they have good chances to attain 
their goals. In contrast, in countries where these bonds are weak or absent, unions have to exert 
pressure by the means of  collective action (Korpi and Shalev, 1979). The Political Exchange Model 
not only allows for cross-country analyses but also for single case studies, where the focus is put on 
shifts of  power between different political parties (on the Spanish case, see Luque, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). 
The political exchange can be considered as “positive” if  bonds between unions and the government 
are strong and an ongoing social dialogue prevails. It turns “negative” when the dialogue comes to a 
halt or does not exist and the unions adopt contentious tactics to exert pressure on the state (Luque, 
2012b: 99). 
Because of  the limited time period under study, I will not be able to put all the models to the 
test. Institutionalisation, for instance, is considered an ongoing but in particular a long-run process. 
For its examination, it would be necessary to include the entire process since Spain’s so-called transition 
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to democracy in the second half  of  the 1970s. The same accounts for the scrutiny of  Silver’s (2003) 
model of  the pendulum swings between crises of  profitability and crises of  social legitimacy. Her 
model better suits mid- or long-term processes and does not apply to the 2008 financial crisis, which 
was not a “crisis of  profitability” caused by concessions made by employers in order to bring labour 
movements under control. 
The above-mentioned restrictions led me to focus this analysis on two dimensions of  strikes and 
on their related explanatory models: first, the political dimension and the corresponding political 
exchange model, which expects heightened strike activity after the imposition of  labour market 
reforms by the Spanish government against the will of  the unions; and second, the economic 
dimension, where I will address the question of  whether the economic crisis has weakened the workers’ 
bargaining power and thus led to a decrease in strike activity (which would be in line with the Business 
Cycle Model) or, on the contrary, whether the relative deprivation produced by the economic crisis has 
fomented the use of  strikes (which would be in line with the relative deprivation hypothesis).  
 
 
Conceptualisation of Strike Activity 
Following the definition of  the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1993: n.p.), strikes are 
considered here as “a temporary work stoppage effected by one or more groups of  workers with a 
view to enforcing or resisting demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other workers in their 
demands or grievances”. The investigation of  strike activity will be based on annual data provided by 
the Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security. It collects statistics on the number of  strikes, 
the number of  workers participating in strike action and the number of  working days lost due to strike 
action, and breaks these variables down according to different subcategories (e.g. economic sector, 
strike motives, strike outcome). Not included in the data provided by this ministry are values regarding 
one nationwide strike of  the public sector in 2010 and three nationwide general strikes3 (one in 2010 
and two in 2012). Following the approach adopted by González and Luque (2014) and Luque and 
González (2016), the missing data regarding the three nationwide general strikes will be reconstructed 
on the basis of  surveys conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in the aftermath of  
each general strike. Extrapolating these numbers to the entire working population allows for rough 
estimates regarding participation in the general strikes. As a result, only the 2010 strike of  the public 
sector, for which the same survey procedure does not apply, has to be omitted from the analysis. 
In this paper, I will go beyond an evaluation of  the absolute numbers provided by the Spanish 
Ministry of  Employment and Social Security and include an analysis of  the shape of  strikes, as proposed 
by Shorter and Tilly (1971; 1974) and later adopted by various other scholars (Hibbs, 1978; Luque, 
Cueto and Mato, 2008; Luque, 2013). According to this conceptualisation, various aspects of  strike 
activity should be considered: first, the size of  strikes, defined as the total number of  strikers over the 
total number of  strikes; second, their duration, specified as working days lost in strike action over the 
number of  workers involved; and third, the strike frequency, calculated by the total number of  strikes 
over the working population under study. Based on these three aspects of  strikes, two additional 
                                                 
3 Although three general strikes occurred during the economic crisis, the Spanish Ministry of  Employment and 
Social Security provides data only on the first general strike of  the period under study, which took place in 2002. 
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characteristics of  strikes can be defined: strike magnitude, which is equal to the average of  working days 
lost per strike; and strike volume, which is equal to the working days lost per 1 000 employees. 
 
 Strike volume = strike size x strike duration x strike frequency 
 
   1 000 =         (  ℎ ) 
 
 
This conceptualisation has the advantage of  making visible various aspects of  strikes, which the 
absolute numbers do not reflect. The identical magnitude or volume of  strike activity can in fact differ 
significantly in their shapes. For instance, as shown in Figure 1, large strike size combined with low 










Figure 1. Possible different shapes of  the same strike volume 
 
 
This definition leads us to discuss the possible implications of  the two theoretical models under study 
on the shape of  strikes during the recent economic crisis in Spain. Strike frequency would be expected 
to decrease in the Business Cycle Model, whereas in the Political Exchange Model an increase is, if  not 
expected, then at least conceivable after the social consensus has come to an end. Regarding the strike 
duration, the Business Cycle Model suggests two contrary scenarios: On the one hand, workers are 
expected to aim at reducing additional money loss which strike action involves and thus to limit strike 
duration. On the other hand, due to their increased bargaining power, employers are expected to be 
less likely to comply with workers’ claims, which would cause workers to strike for longer periods in 
order to have their demands met. The Political Exchange Model is not explicit regarding strike 
duration. Having said this, it stresses the demonstrative aspect of  strikes: they are directed toward the 
government rather than intended to inflict losses in production on the employers. This suggests that 
strikes do not have to be particularly long. Regarding strike size, the Business Cycle Model would 
indicate a decline due to a shift from more general (offensive) demands, such as claims for collective 
agreements for entire industries, towards more factory-related strikes against specific threats such as 
factory closures or mass dismissals. In the Political Exchange Model, strike size is crucial for exerting 
pressure on the government and is thus expected to rise after a disbanding of  the social consensus. 





a = strike size 
b = strike duration 
c = strike frequency 
 




Political and Economic Aspects of Strike Activity during the Recent Economic 
Crisis in Spain 
 
The state of the economy and political transformations between 2002 and 2013 
In this section, I will first present the economic performance of  the country by taking a closer look at 
employment levels in general but also at the different economic sectors. In a second step, I will portray 
some of  the most relevant political transformations which are likely to have affected workers and 
unions. This will help to examine, in the later sub-sections, which factors actually account for 
continuities and changes in strike activity during the recent economic crisis.  
As it is shown in Table 1, the first six-year period presents a decrease in unemployment rates4 
and a relatively steady increase in the total number of  persons employed. In the second period, this 
trend is reversed, still slight in 2008 and sharply in 2009. The specification of  employment levels for 
different economic sectors shows that they were unequally affected by the economic crisis. The number 
of  persons employed in the service sector continued to increase in 2008 and experienced a 
comparatively moderate decrease during subsequent years. In the industrial sector, employment 
remained virtually stable until 2008 but suffered a sudden drop in 2009 and continued to decrease until 
2013, losing 28 per cent of  its workforce between 2007 and 2013. Of  all sectors, the construction 
sector experienced the strongest increase in employment levels in the run-up to the crisis, but, after 
the bursting of  the real estate bubble, it also underwent the sharpest decline, losing more than 60 per 
cent of  its workforce between 2007 and 2013 and remaining, in 2013, at 52 per cent of  the employment 
level of  2002. The agricultural sector shows a particular evolution with relatively stable numbers 
between 2002 and 2005, but losing 7 per cent of  its workforce during the subsequent two years and 
thus prior to the outbreak of  the crisis. The number of  persons employed in the agricultural sector 
further decreased during the crisis, reaching, in 2013, 78 per cent of  the employment level recorded in 
2002. A divergence also becomes manifest when comparing the private with the public sector. While 
in the former sector employment levels started to decrease in 2008 and, by 2013, were virtually equal 
to the level of  2002, the latter sector further expanded until 2011 and only decreased during the last 
two years under study.  
The numbers thus indicate that although a trend reversal can already be discerned in 2008, 
employment was particularly struck in 2009 and then continued to decrease in successive years. The 
only exceptions to this were in the agricultural sector, which was already experiencing a decline prior 
to the crisis, and the public sector, which seems to have been more resistant to the negative 






                                                 
4 The year 2003 is the only year to present a slight deviation, with an increase of  0.1 percentage point in the 
unemployment rate.  
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Notes: (1) Per cent values show the relative changes compared to the base year, 2002. (2) Employment numbers 
are in thousands and include self-employed people. As the latter implies that the number of  employed people 
susceptible to participate in strike action is in fact lower, the calculated rates of  strike frequency (and thus also of  
strike volumes) have to be considered underestimations. 
Sources: labour statistics from Eurostat (n.d.), ILO (n.d.) and OECD (n.d.). 
 
 
At a political level, the timeframe under study begins with the two last years of  the conservative 
Popular Party’s (PP) government led by José María Aznar, whose “third way conservatism” (Hamann, 
2005), characterised by tripartite negotiations, came to a momentary halt when he implemented a 
reform of  the unemployment benefit system despite the opposition of  the two major unions Comisiones 
Obreras (CCOO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). In 2004, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(PSOE) wan the parliamentary elections and José Luis Rodriguéz Zapatero was elected Prime Minister 
of  Spain. This led to a strengthening of  the social dialogue between unions, employers and the state. 
Yet, the economic crisis and the concomitant credit restrictions in the private sector and the steep rise 
in unemployment led to a severe fiscal crisis. In 2010, the social democratic government considered 
that cuts in public spending were unavoidable to remedy the country’s budget crisis, and in May of  
that same year the government decreed the first austerity measures, including a 5 per cent wage cut in 
the public sector. Shortly after, in June 2010, the government finally unilaterally decreed a labour 
market reform. This unilateral path did not last long. During the following year, tripartite negotiations 
were resumed and a “social and economic agreement” was reached, which should favour growth, job 
creation and guarantee pensions. That same year, Zapatero called early elections, which were won by 
the Popular Party under the leadership of  Mariano Rajoy. This government pushed another labour 
market reform, which was decreed in February 2012 against the will of  CCOO and UGT. 
 
The overview: a descriptive account of strike activity prior to and during the recent 
economic crisis in Spain 
Before trying to understand why some aspects of  strikes changed after the outbreak of  the Great 
Recession, I will draw a picture of  how they have changed, notably by comparing the six-year period 
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preceding the Great Recession (2002–2007) and the one covering the first six years since its outbreak 
(2008–2013).  
As is clear from Table 2, different aspects of  strikes have evolved unequally over time. 
Furthermore, certain aspects of  strikes – notably strike size – vary greatly depending on whether or 
not general strikes are taken into account. In order to facilitate the subsequent interpretation, I will 
first depict the evolution of  the shape of  strikes by omitting the general strikes and then show how 
the picture changes when they are included.  
 
 
Table 2. Strike activity in Spain between 2002 and 2013 
 
 
Notes: (1) Values in brackets include general strikes. (2) Due to lack of  data, the values do not include the general strike 
of  the public sector which took place on 8 June 2010. (3) Numbers of  participants in the 2010 and 2012 general strikes 
are taken from Luque and González (2016: 12). 
Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.) (unless otherwise specified); own calculations. 
 
 
Regarding the mean strike frequency, the value for the second period under study is 29 per cent 
(or 1.1 percentage point) higher than the one recorded for the pre-crisis period. Contemplating only 
the absolute numbers of  strikes, one would be tempted to infer that an increase in strike activity already 
occurred prior to the crisis, since 2006 and 2007 show the highest values of  the first six-year period. 
The measurement of  strike frequency (and thus the consideration of  the growing employment levels 
during the first six years under study), however, shows that strike frequency remained rather stable (or 
even decreased) during this first period and that it experienced a first sharp increase only in 2009 (see 
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Figure 2). The data also reveal a dip in 2011 before reaching the highest score in 2013, overtopping (in 




    
 
Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
 
Figure 2. Number of  strikes and strike frequency in Spain  
 
 
Regarding strike size, a trend towards smaller strikes can be observed. The first six-year period 
is characterised by relatively high strike size levels (978 workers per strike in 2002 and 1 081 workers 
per strike in 2003); this more than halves by 2005, reaching only 495 per strike in that year. During the 
following four years the level settles at around 650, but then drops again in 2010, reaching the lowest 
level in 2011 (286 workers per strike). During the two subsequent years the level slightly increases 
again, but remains under the level observed at the onset of  the crisis. 
For the period of  the economic crisis, the mean strike duration has fallen slightly (from 2.9 days 
per strike to 2.6) compared to the prior period. However, this finding is mainly due to an outlier case 
in 2004, when the average strike duration reached 8 days per striker. This value – twice as high as the 
second highest number (reached in 2012) – results from an extraordinarily long-lasting strike in the 
agricultural sector in Andalusia. If  we leave aside this outlier, the conclusion would in fact be reversed 
and the crisis would have been accompanied by an increase in strike duration. Since strike duration is 
a multiplication factor in both strike magnitude and strike volume, this outlier case also becomes visible 
in these respective values. While the mean strike magnitude between 2002 and 2007 remains above the 
one calculated for the second period, even when the outlier is left aside, the same does not apply to 
the strike volume, where a slight increase can be observed during the crisis if  the outlier case is not 
included. The fact that, when omitting the outlier, the increase in strike volume is accompanied by a 
decrease in strike magnitude indicates that the increase in strike duration did not outweigh the decrease 
in strike size (since strike magnitude still decreases) and, hence, that the increase in strike volume is 
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mainly due to the increased strike frequency.  
Regarding the course of  their evolution, strike magnitude and strike volume (including the outlier 
case) show a similar evolution. Both reflect the outlier peak in 2004, an upwards trend between 2005 
and 2008, a subsequent dip after the onset of  the crisis, and again higher values for the last two years 





Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security; own calculations. 
 
Figure 3. Strike magnitude and strike volume  
 
 
The aspects most affected by the inclusion of  the four general strikes (in 2002, 2010, and two in 
2012) are strike size and, to a lesser extent, strike duration. Not surprisingly, the mean strike size 
significantly increases. The fact that three out of  four general strikes occurred during the second period 
under study also inverts the above-described tendency towards smaller strikes (with 2 043 workers per 
strike for the latter period compared to 1 713 for the prior period). Strike duration decreases since all 
general strikes lasted only one day (i.e. less than the average strike duration when omitting general 
strikes). Here again, the effect is greater in the second period where three general strikes occurred and 
the drop in strike duration is more substantial (from 2.8 days per strike during the first period to 1.9 
during the second) than if  general strikes are omitted (from 2.9 to 2.6 days per strike). 
As a consequence of  the above described changes in strike size and strike duration, strike 
magnitude and strike volume also increase and, by including three new peak years (2012, 2002 and to 
a lesser extent 2010), depict more accurately the actual dimensions of  strike magnitudes and strike 
volumes between 2002 and 2013 (see Figure 3). Compared to the numbers omitting general strikes, 
mean strike magnitude increases by 76 per cent (reaching 2 928 working days lost per strike compared 
to 1 667 when omitting the general strikes). Furthermore, the gap between the periods under study 
becomes smaller (with 3 103 working days lost per strike during the first period and 2 752 during the 
second) and is actually reversed if  the outlier case in 2004 is left aside. Regarding strike volume, the 
mean of  the second period (137 working days lost per 1 000 employees) exceeds the pre-crisis period 
(122 working days lost per 1 000 employees) even when the 2004 outlier case is included. This points 
to the impact of  the increase in strike size during the second period, which is mainly due to the two 
general strikes in 2012. 
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First insights: lack of alignment between the theoretical models and the observed strike 
activity 
The picture presented above provides strong arguments against the Business Cycle Model. Contrary 
to the expected downward trend in strike activity, strike frequency significantly increased during the 
economic crisis. The other aspects of  strikes do not show as clear-cut trends. However, if  the general 
strikes are taken into account, both strike size and strike volume also increase, which also goes against 
the expectations of  the model. When looking at the general picture, economic factors as specified in 
the Business Cycle Model do not seem to account for the observed strike activity during the recent 
economic crisis. One could even argue that the findings are rather in line with the theoretical 
counterpart – the relative deprivation hypothesis – which considers that “both short-term and 
persistent deprivation are significant causes of  the various forms of  civil strife” (Gurr, 1969: 603).  
Compared with the Business Cycle Model, the Political Exchange Model seems to fit much 
better. The timeframe under study begins with a general strike in 2002, which represents a rupture in 
the “third way conservatism” (Hamann, 2005), leading to a negative turn in the political exchange 
between the conservative government and the unions. A period of  enhanced social dialogue follows 
the coming into power of  the social democratic party in 2004 – that is, a period of  positive political 
exchange – which is reflected in rather low and stable strike frequency. Yet, the Great Recession 
changes the parameters of  the social dialogue, and in 2010 the social democratic government is forced 
to implement cuts in public spending as well as labour market reform. These announcements are 
followed, in the same year, first by a general strike in the public sector and soon after by a cross-sectoral 
general strike. The year after, tripartite negotiations are resumed, which is accompanied by an 
important dip in strike magnitude and strike volume. Furthermore, these lowest levels of  strike 
magnitude and strike volume reached in 2011 also coincide with national elections, which could 
indicate that the unions intentionally tempered their use of  contentious tactics in support of  the social 
democratic president seeking re-election. If  general strikes are included, the highest values of  strike 
volume are measured for 2012, the year in which the newly elected conservative government decrees 
labour market reform going far beyond the one implemented by the social democratic government 
two years earlier. As a reaction, and for the first time since the so-called transition to democracy, two 
nationwide general strikes are called during a single year. The political exchange having clearly turned 
negative again, it remains negative also in 2013, when the highest values of  strike frequency can be 
observed. 
While the Political Exchange Model is able to account for periods of  relatively stable strike 
activity but also for sudden massive strikes, there are also evolutions which are more difficult to explain. 
For instance, how should one interpret the steep increase in strike frequency in 2009, which happened 
prior to the rupture in the positive political exchange between unions and the social democratic 
government? And what about the tendency towards smaller strikes (if  general strikes are not included)? 
If  strikes are directed towards the government, why should strikes become smaller in size? Since 
neither of  the two models have yielded satisfactory explanations for the general evolutions in the shape 
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Similarities and disparities between different economic sectors 
A comparison of  the shape of  strikes in different economic sectors exhibits differences independent
of  the economic crisis. In line with other studies on industrial action (see Salamon, 2000), the industrial 
sector exhibits by far the highest strike frequency for the whole period under study (see Figure 4). In 
addition, a sharp increase in strike frequency can be observed since the outbreak of  the crisis. The 
second highest values (but at a considerably lower level) are reached by the service sector. These values 
show a slight downward trend prior to the crisis and a slight upward trend during the crisis. The 
construction sector has experienced the sharpest increase in strike frequency in the aftermath of  the 
crisis. While there was a mean strike frequency of  0.54 per 100 000 workers for the period between 
2002 and 2007, this value more than quintupled in the second period under study (2.87 strikes per 
100 000 workers) and has, at times, even equalled the strike frequency of  the service sector. In the case 
of  the construction sector, the sharp increase in strike frequency is the combined result of  an increase 
in the absolute number of  strikes and the aforementioned sharp decrease in employment levels. The 
agricultural sector exhibits an unsteady evolution at a rather low level, showing the lowest rates of  





Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
 
Figure 4. Strike frequency in various economic sectors  
 
 
Overall, the mean strike size decreased between the two periods under study in three out of  four 
sectors (industry, construction and services; see Table 3) – rather slightly (by 7.1 per cent) in the service 
sector, more substantially in the industrial sector (by 25.8 per cent), and the most in the construction 
sector (by 58.7 per cent). The agricultural sector is the only one to exhibit an increase in the mean 
strike size (by 20.5 per cent, and even more than twelve-fold if  we leave aside the outlier case in 2004).  
Similarly to the general figures, strike duration also exhibits an unsteady course when subdivided 
into economic sectors. The only sector with a relatively constant strike duration level is the service 
sector. Seen over the whole period of  observation it varies between 1.4 and 3.8 days per striker, and 
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the mean values of  both periods are identical (2.4 days per striker). The construction and the 
agricultural sector exhibit higher peaks prior to the crisis (even when excluding the outlier case). This 
explains why the mean values of  the first six-year period are higher than the ones of  the second period.5 
The industrial sector is the only one to manifest an increase in mean strike duration (from 2.7 to 3.7 
days per striker), which is mainly due to a peak in 2012, where it reached 8.9 days per striker.  
 
 
Table 3. Strike size and strike duration according to economic sector  
 
 
Notes: (1) Values include the public sector (mainly as part of  the service sector) but neither the four nationwide 
general strikes in 2002, 2010 and 2012 nor the nationwide general strike of  the public sector in 2010. (2) Values in 
brackets exclude an outlier case in 2004.  
Sources: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
 
 
Articulation of  strike frequency with the respective employment levels in the different sectors 
indicates that those sectors which experienced the most sudden and the sharpest decrease in 
employment (i.e. construction and industry) were also those that have seen their strike frequency 
increase most abruptly. The findings thus suggest that the deeper and the more sudden negative 
impacts of  the economic crisis are, the more frequently workers resort to strikes. Diametrically 
opposed to the Business Cycle Model, this seems again rather in line with its counterpart, the relative 
deprivation hypothesis. However, before jumping to premature conclusions, I will further deepen the 
analysis by comparing the evolutions between the public and the private sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is noteworthy to mention that in the construction sector the highest value of  strike size during the crisis 
period (recorded at its outbreak in 2008) coincides with the lowest value of  strike duration (0.03 days per striker, 
which is equal to 43 minutes per striker). This finding calls for further examination but could be an indicator 
that the workers in this sector were taken by surprise and that they were overstrained with the events. 
Year Industry Construction Services Industry Construction Services
2002 194 253 53 521 4.1 3.4 28.2 2.1
2003 220 443 69 266 2.9 3.0 16.0 2.6
2004 8380 (256) 583 1356 639 27.4 (7.7) 2.6 26.1 1.9
2005 113 608 67 419 12.7 1.7 2.0 2.9
2006 35 422 6374 501 3.8 2.3 1.0 2.1
2007 64 272 5645 513 7.7 2.9 3.6 2.5
Mean (2002-2007) 1501 (147) 430 2261 477 9.8 (6.5) 2.7 12.8 2.4
2008 644 454 3026 665 3.0 2.5 0.0 3.8
2009 6058 598 2032 324 4.0 1.8 1.1 1.9
2010 3321 231 105 358 1.0 3.1 9.7 1.4
2011 135 201 249 279 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.4
2012 39 211 60 393 1.7 8.9 5.9 2.9
2013 656 220 133 641 2.5 3.1 11.6 2.2
Mean (2008-2013) 1809 319 934 443 2.4 3.7 5.0 2.4
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Some contrary trends in the public and the private sectors 
The shape of  strikes exhibits some clear differences between public and private ownership of  the 
workplaces. For nearly the entire period under study, strike duration has been higher and strike size 
lower in the private sector (see Table 4). I expect the difference in strike size to be due to the fact that 
different activities in the public sector are eventually united under one common negotiating partner (at 
local, regional or national level), which facilitates inter-professional and thus bigger strikes. Regarding 
strike duration, the data suggests that negotiations are tougher in the private sector, which requires 
longer strike actions from the workers in this sector.  
 
 
Table 4. Strike activity in the private and public sectors  
 
 
Notes: (1) Values include neither the four nationwide general strikes in 2002, 2010 and 2012 nor the nationwide general 
strike of  the public sector in 2010. (2) Values in brackets exclude an outlier case in 2004  
Sources: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d); own calculations. 
 
 
When comparing strike frequency between the private and the public sectors, two contrary 
trends can be discerned (see Figure 5). Although with a high volatility, a tendency towards a decline in 
strike frequency can be observed in the public sector. In the private sector, the slight downward trend 
observed prior to the crisis has inverted sharply with the outbreak of  the crisis. Both tendencies 
combined have led, at the outset of  the crisis, to an inversion of  the sector more prone to engage in 
strike action. This leads us to the conclusion that the increase in strike frequency presented in the 
previous subsections has to be ascribed entirely to the private sector. 
The relative stability in the workforce in the public sector (and its increase until 2011) indicates 
that this sector has been less affected by the economic crisis, and at a later point. In the private sector, 
where an important decrease in employment levels can be observed for the period following the 
outbreak of  the economic crisis, the increase in strike frequency would again be in line with the relative 
deprivation hypothesis. However, as I will show in the following sections, it would be misleading to 
ascribe the increase in strike frequency in the private sector to an increased strike propensity in this 
sector.  
 
Public sector Public sector Public sector Public sector Public sector
2002 3.82 5.02 308 755 2.9 2.0 895 1473 34 74
2003 3.72 4.36 355 4491 3.2 0.3 1139 1345 42 59
2004 3.45 (3.44) 5.96 696 (482) 877 11.2 (3.6) 1.5 7768 (1737) 1353 268 (60) 81
2005 3.15 4.99 384 656 2.3 2.8 874 1859 28 93
2006 3.61 4.96 362 653 2.2 2.2 796 1444 29 72
2007 3.46 4.33 416 532 3.2 2.6 1345 1398 47 60
Mean 2002-2007 3.53 (3.53) 4.94 420 (385) 1327 4.2 (2.9) 1.9 2136 (1131) 1479 75 (40) 73
2008 3.67 5.21 462 883 3.6 2.8 1667 2466 61 128
2009 5.62 3.14 606 934 2.1 1.1 1299 1070 73 34
2010 5.35 4.35 247 902 2.6 1.0 650 863 35 37
2011 4.52 2.57 164 891 2.7 2.0 440 1767 20 45
2012 5.06 3.98 143 1111 7.8 2.6 1123 2928 57 117
2013 6.20 3.51 305 528 3.0 2.2 917 1174 57 41
Mean 2008-2013 5.07 3.79 321 875 3.6 2.0 1016 1711 50 67
Mean 2002-2013 4.30 (4.30) 4.36 371 (353) 1101 3.9 (3.3) 1.9 1576 (1073) 1595 62 (45) 70
Private sector
Year
Private sector Private sector Private sector Private sector
Strike frequency Strike size Strike duration Strike magmitude Strike volume
 





Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
 




A shift towards single-workplace-related and more defensive strikes  
The increase in strike frequency combined with the decline in strike size (if  general strikes are omitted) 
invites one to examine the background of  this trend. As illustrated in Figure 6, the numbers indicate 
that the increase in strike actions is primarily due to an increased strike frequency in single workplaces. 
This points to a shift away from more general (e.g. sectoral or industry-wide) strikes towards strikes 
related to single workplaces. 
 This again raises the question of  the background of  this increase in single-workplace-related 
strikes. The examination of  strike motives provides some explanations. As shown in Figure 7, the 
frequency of  collective-bargaining-related strikes decreased while the frequency of  other labour-
related strikes increased and frequency of  non-labour-related strikes (such as union-related strikes, 
solidarity strikes, or strikes against policy reforms) remained rather stable.  
When analysing the motives of  labour-related (but not collective-bargaining-related) strikes, a 
shift towards strikes that can be considered more defensive becomes evident. For example, non-
payment of  wages as a strike motive experienced a sharp increase between 2009 and 2010 and has 
become the most frequent motive for strikes ever since. Strikes due to industrial restructuring or staff  
downsizing plans have also increased strongly in 2009 but the subsequent evolution of  their frequency 
has been more volatile. The frequency of  strikes due to disciplinary measures of  the company 
(including dismissals of  single workers) or because of  non-compliance with labour and employment 
laws have also increased, although to a lesser extent.  
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Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d); own calculations. 
 







Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
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This increase in strike motives which can be qualified as “defensive” due to their objective of  
preventing or undoing layoffs or deterioration of  working conditions was accompanied by a decrease 
in “offensive” strike motives – that is, strikes seeking an improvement of  working conditions and thus 
going beyond the preservation of  the status quo. When omitting collective bargaining – which can but 
does not necessarily include aims for improvements – the data provides two motives which can be 
assigned to those “offensive” motives: “improvements independent from collective agreements” or 
“improvements for staffs not covered by collective agreements”. The first motive shows a decrease for 
the period following the outbreak of  the crisis, reaching its lowest level during the last two years under 
study. The second motive exposes a similar tendency but completely ceases to occur during the last 
two years under study. Finally, other strike motives include the following categories: workflow-related 
strikes, strikes due to labour-related accidents, and “other” strike motives. These cannot be clearly 
ascribed to either offensive or defensive categories, and equally expose a declining trend. When added 
up into three categories (defensive strike motives, offensive strike motives, other strike motives), the 




Source: Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security (n.d.); own calculations. 
 
Figure 8. Strike frequency (labour-related motives excluding collective bargaining) 
according to the offensive or defensive nature of  strike motives  
 
 
The increased frequency of  defensive strikes is in line with the previous observations of  an 
increase in single-workplace-related strikes. Staff  downsizing, industrial restructuring and non-
payment of  wages – to mention only the most frequent strike motives – may be widespread in times 
of  crisis but they manifest themselves primarily at company or workplace level. All this indicates that, 
after all, the underlying assumption of  the Business Cycle Model – that is, a decrease in workers’ 
bargaining power in times of  economic downturn – indeed applies to the Spanish case. However, the 
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decreasing propensity of  the workers to go on strike was overcompensated by an increasing number 




This article has aimed to provide a better understanding of  the evolution of  strike activity in Spain 
between 2002 and 2013. The presented analysis is based on a descriptive evaluation of  data provided 
by the Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social Security, which served as a basis in order to 
calculate variables able to reflect the “shape of  strikes” (Shorter and Tilly, 1974). This made possible 
an analysis of  different aspects of  strikes, which would not have become visible through the 
examination of  the absolute numbers provided by the Spanish Ministry of  Employment and Social 
Security. 
As shown in the descriptive part of  the paper, the crisis was accompanied by a manifest increase 
in strike frequency and by three nationwide general strikes in 2010 and 2012. However, if  the general 
strikes are excluded, the crisis is accompanied by a (less distinct) decrease in strike size after 2009. The 
sectoral analysis equally presents an increase in mean strike frequency with the outbreak of  the 
economic crisis in all four economic sectors (agriculture, industry, construction and services). The fact 
that the sharpest increases in strike frequency were recorded in the sectors most hit by the economic 
crisis (i.e. construction and industry) suggests a positive correlation between the intensity of  job 
destruction and strike frequency. This hypothesis is supported by a similar but much weaker tendency 
observed in the service sector, where the decrease in employment levels was considerably lower. 
Regarding strike size, a similar pattern could be discerned for these three sectors: all show a decrease 
in strike size during the second period under study, more pronounced in the construction and in the 
industrial sectors and less so in the service sector. This suggests that the increased number of  mass 
layoffs, non-payment of  wages and other deterioration of  working conditions provided an increased 
number of  motives for strikes, although on a smaller scale. This finding is supported by the identified 
increase in strikes in single workplaces. Whereas employment levels negatively correlate with strike 
frequency and strike size in the three above-mentioned sectors, other variables are needed in order to 
explain the evolution in the agricultural sector, where no particular crisis-related pattern could be 
observed.  
As the shift towards single-workplace-related strikes already indicates, it would be erroneous to 
conclude that the increased strike frequency results from an increased propensity for strike action. In 
fact, the inversion that occurred between the private and public sectors regarding their respective strike 
frequency suggests rather the opposite: in the public sector where, during the timeframe under study, 
the impact of  the economic crisis has been considerably weaker than in the private sector, a decreasing 
strike frequency could be observed. It can be assumed that the economic crisis caused uncertainty 
among the workers in the public sector, which led them to moderate their claims. The opposite trend 
was observed in the private sector; rather than accounting for an increasing propensity to go on strikes, 
this suggests that an actual decrease in workers’ bargaining power was overcompensated by a growing 
number of  cases in which the recourse to strike action appeared as a means of  last resort (e.g. mass 
layoffs or non-payment of  wages).  
The analysis presented here shows that, alone, neither the Business Cycle Model nor the Political 
Exchange Model is able to account for the evolution in strike activity between 2002 and 2013 in Spain. 
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As became clear, the Political Exchange Model proves to be useful for understanding rather stable 
periods such as the one preceding the economic crisis, the peaks (i.e. the occurrence of  large-scale, 
nationwide general strikes), but also of  dips, such as the one observed in both strike frequency and 
strike volume in 2011. It seems probable that the unions indeed limited their strikes to the minimum 
in order to relieve pressure on the social democratic party in power, whose prime minister was running 
for re-election. Yet, that same model proves less suitable for explaining the evolutions at a smaller scale. 
The Business Cycle Model, for its part, is unable to explain the peaks (i.e. the general strikes) but also 
sudden dips. What’s more, the increased strike frequency during the crisis manifestly contradicts the 
model, which expects periods of  economic downturn to weaken workers’ bargaining power and thus 
to lead a decreasing number of  strikes. However, while my work contradicts the expected result of  the 
model, the shift towards single-workplace-related and so-called “defensive” strikes strongly suggests 
that the shape but also the character of  strikes were much affected by the weakened bargaining position 
of  the workers. 
The usefulness of  combining the two theoretical models points at the weaknesses of  previous 
works on the Spanish case, which are mainly descriptive (Gil and Hernández, 2014; Lacalle, 2015;) or 
focus primarily on political aspects of  strikes (Luque, 2012b), thereby underestimating economic 
factors which have proven to affect strike activity in times of  economic crisis. Yet, the analysis also has 
its weaknesses. First, the dichotomic division into a period preceding the crisis (2002–2007) and 
another beginning at its outbreak (2008–2013) might be oversimplified and would need more 
specification. A more precise image of  the evolution of  the crisis would surely facilitate a better 
understanding of  the relationship between the course of  the crisis and strike activity. Likewise, state 
interventions, policy changes or their respective announcement (Edelman, 1985) should be given 
greater attention, since particularly (announcements of) policy changes affecting the bargaining 
framework are likely to affect strike activity. Second, other theoretical approaches (e.g. Marxist, 
institutional theories, or the resource mobilisation approach) might have provided further pieces of  
the “puzzle of  strikes” (Franzosi, 1995).  
Finally, an argument should be made for adopting a broader perspective on industrial conflict. 
Relating strikes to other forms of  resistance (e.g. demonstrations, petitions, sit-ins, etc.) would provide 
a better understanding of  the interconnectedness of  these different political phenomena. In fact, 
recent research indicates that scholars working on industrial conflict would be well advised to enlarge 
their scope to forms of  resistance other than strikes (Béroud et al., 2008; Groux and Pernot, 2008; 
Giraud, 2009). These scholars have found that industrial conflict can actually increase even in periods 
of  declining strike activity, when tactics other than strikes are taken into account. While posing many 
methodological challenges, such perspective would take us a good way towards a more complex 
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